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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to predict whether the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would permit an employee 
injured in an on-the-job automobile accident to recover 
from both workers' compensation as well as from an 
uninsured motorist plan that his employer voluntarily 
purchased. The district court held that workers' 
compensation was the employee's exclusive remedy. Shortly 
after that ruling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that 
state law did not bar an employee's recovery from both 
workers' compensation and an uninsured motorist plan. 
Because the Superior Court's reasoning is persuasive, we 
will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
In May of 1994, Joseph N. DiBartolo was injured while 
occupying an automobile owned by his employer, Knight- 
Ridder, Inc.1 At the time of the accident, DiBartolo was 
acting in the course and scope of his employment. 
Subsequently, DiBartolo recovered workers' compensation 
and medical benefits from Knight-Ridder's insurer, 
Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois. Thereafter, he sought 
uninsured motorist benefits under an automobile insurance 
policy issued by Travelers to Knight-Ridder, which had 
voluntarily purchased the policy. Travelers responded by 
bringing this action for declaratory judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The material facts are not in dispute. 
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Travelers asked the district court to hold that DiBartolo's 
recovery of workers' compensation benefits after an on-the- 
job automobile accident precluded his later recovery on the 
uninsured motorist plan purchased by his employer. In the 
alternative, Travelers asked the district court to hold that 
Knight-Ridder had waived uninsured motorist coverage in 
Pennsylvania. After a pre-trial conference, the district court 
instructed the parties to file motions solely on the issue of 
the exclusivity of workers' compensation in Pennsylvania. 
In its Amended Order of November 25, 1996, the district 
court granted Travelers' motion for summary judgment. The 
court did not issue an opinion, but it cited Ducjai v. Dennis, 
636 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (en banc), aff'd, 656 
A.2d 102 (Pa. 1995), in its order. DiBartolo took a timely 
appeal.2 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
This appeal requires us to determine the effect of the 
Pennsylvania legislature's 1993 repeal of Section 17353 and 
Section 17374 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility 
Law (MVFRL). Travelers argues that the repeal of these 
sections of the MVFRL indicated a clear legislative intent. 
Indeed, when these statutes are read, they seem to have 
clearly authorized the collection of both workers' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1332. Our appellate jurisdiction lies pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
3. Section 1735 had provided that "[t]he coverage required by this 
subchapter [mandatory uninsured motorist coverage] shall not be made 
subject to an exclusion or reduction in amount because of any workers' 
compensation benefits payable as the result of the same injury." 75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 1735 (repealed). 
 
4. Section 1737 had provided that "[n]otwithstanding anything contained 
in the Act of June 2, 1915 (P.L. 736, No. 338), known as the 
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, no employee who is 
otherwise eligible shall be precluded from recovery of uninsured or 
underinsured motorist benefits from an employer's motor vehicle policy 
under this chapter . . . ." 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1737 (repealed). 
 
                                3 
 
 
 
compensation and uninsured motorist benefits. Therefore, 
the repeal of these statutes would seem to have 
unambiguously reinstated the general rule that workers' 
compensation is the exclusive remedy available to 
employees injured on the job. See 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 481(a).5 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in 
Hackenberg v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 586 A.2d 
879 (Pa. 1991), suggests, however, that Travelers' isolated, 
straightforward reading of Sections 1735 and 1737 is 
misguided. First, according to the Court in Hackenberg, 
Section 1737--the statute that, of the two, seemed to 
extend unequivocally to employees the privilege of receiving 
both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist 
benefits--never affected employers such as DiBartolo's 
(Knight-Ridder, Inc.) who voluntarily purchased uninsured 
motorist plans. As the Court noted in Hackenberg, Section 
1737 was enacted several years after Section 1735. Id. at 
880 n.3. Prior to the enactment of Section 1737, the Court 
held, Section 1735 did not authorize employees of self- 
insured employers to receive both workers' compensation 
and uninsured motorist benefits. Id. at 885. 
 
In its earlier resolution of Hackenberg, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court had noted that state law differentiated 
between self-insured employers and employers who 
purchased uninsured motorist plans. Hackenberg v. SEPTA, 
558 A.2d 860, 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). Under its view of 
the law, injured employees who had received workers' 
compensation benefits could also recover on uninsured 
motorist plans that had been purchased by their employers. 
Id. Nonetheless, injured employees were barred from 
recovering both types of benefits when their employers were 
self-insured. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the 
Superior Court's analysis, holding that self-insured 
employers--in the absence of Section 1737--were under a 
different set of obligations than were employers who 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This statute, the exclusivity provision of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, states that "[t]he liability of an employer under this Act shall be 
exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes 
[sic] 
. . . in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death 
as defined. . . ." 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 481(a). 
 
                                4 
 
 
 
purchased plans. Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 883-84. The 
clear implication of Hackenberg is that prior to the 
enactment of Section 1737, employees could receive 
workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits 
from employers' purchased plans. Id. at 883 (discussing 
insurance policies). If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
thought the Superior Court erred in making the distinction 
that undergirded its opinion, surely the Supreme Court 
would have said so. It is clear, however, that the Supreme 
Court's majority accepted the distinction between self- 
insured employers and employers who purchased plans. 
See id. at 885-86 (Cappy, J., concurring and dissenting, 
arguing that the majority's distinction between self-insured 
and other employers was irrational and not dictated by 
law). 
 
Therefore, we learn from Hackenberg that the ability of 
employees to recover both workers' compensation and 
uninsured motorist benefits via employers' purchased plans 
did not stem from Section 1737. Employees had that ability 
prior to Section 1737. Indeed, it may be that, if anything, 
Section 1737 was enacted to ensure that employees whose 
employers were self-insured would not be penalized by the 
distinction drawn in Hackenberg and other cases such as 
Lewis v. School Dist. of Phila., 538 A.2d 862 (1988) (holding 
that employees of self-insured employers could not, under 
the pre-MVFRL Uninsured Motorist Act, collect uninsured 
motorist benefits). See also Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 883 
n.9 (speculating that the legislative purpose behind Section 
1737 was to ensure that all employees be able to receive 
both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist 
benefits). In any event, as Section 1737 did not affect 
employers who purchased uninsured motorist plans, 
Hackenberg suggests that the repeal of Section 1737 could 
not have had any impact on employees such as DiBartolo. 
 
In Hackenberg, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also 
made clear that Section 1735 was not the source of the 
ability of employees to recover from employers' purchased 
uninsured motorists plans as well as from workers' 
compensation. There the Court specifically rejected a 
suggestion that Section 1735 was designed to ensure an 
employee's access to both workers' compensation and 
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uninsured motorist benefits. Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 883 
& n.9. Instead, the Court held, Section 1735 was a 
restriction on what insurers could include in their 
uninsured motorist plans--plans that employers were then 
required by law to have, in the absence of self-insurance. 
Id. at 883. Therefore, the repeal of Section 1735 was 
required by the legislature's decision to make uninsured 
motorist plans optional. If, as the Hackenberg opinion 
suggests, Section 1735 was not the source of an injured 
employee's recovery of both workers' compensation and 
uninsured motorist benefits, its repeal could not have 
precluded DiBartolo's recovery of both types of benefits. 
 
B. 
 
Despite its analysis in Hackenberg, the Supreme Court 
offered a different view of the legislative repeal of Sections 
1735 and 1737 in Ducjai v. Dennis, 656 A.2d 102 (Pa. 
1995). There an employee filed negligence actions against a 
co-worker and the driver of another vehicle involved in an 
on-the-job accident. Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 103. In sweeping 
language, the Superior Court had held "that worker's 
compensation benefits are the sole and exclusive remedy 
available to employees injured in a motor vehicle accident 
in the course and scope of their employment." Ducjai, 636 
A.2d at 1131. 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior 
Court's holding. Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 107. It phrased the 
final result in much narrower terms, however, holding "that 
an employee may not recover both workers' compensation 
benefits from her employer as well as damages at common 
law from her co-employee . . . when injured in an [on-the- 
job] automobile accident." Id. (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, in the course of its opinion, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the Superior Court that the repeal of 
Sections 1735 and 1737 had greatly affected the ability of 
employees to collect from sources other than workers' 
compensation for on-the-job automobile accidents. Id. at 
106. The Supreme Court approvingly cited the Superior 
Court's observation that "[t]he legislature has tried time 
and again to make it clear that worker's [sic] compensation 
benefits are to be the exclusive remedy for employment- 
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related injuries, save for those intentionally inflicted." Id. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically suggested that the 
legislative repeal had effectively overturned Superior Court 
decisions--Chatham v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co. , 570 A.2d 509 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), and Ferry v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
573 A.2d 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) -- which had permitted 
employees to recover both workers' compensation and 
uninsured motorist benefits. Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 106. In 
striking contrast to Hackenberg, Ducjai suggests that the 
repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737 should bar DiBartolo's 
recovery of both workers' compensation and uninsured 
motorist benefits. 
 
C. 
 
Although the pertinent observations in the Supreme 
Court's Ducjai holding were dicta,6 the Court indicated its 
view that Pennsylvania law now completely precludes an 
employee's recovering both workers' compensation and 
uninsured motorist benefits. Despite Ducjai, two opinions of 
the Superior Court issued after the district court's ruling 
interpreted the legislative repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737 
much differently. In Warner v. Continental/CNA Ins. Co., 
688 A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), allocatur denied, 
698 A.2d 68 (Pa. 1997), the Superior Court held that an 
employee injured in an on-the-job automobile accident 
could collect both workers' compensation and 
underinsured motorist benefits. There the court concluded 
that the exclusivity provisions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act ("WCA") could not, for several reasons, 
operate to bar claims on uninsured/underinsured motorist 
policies. First, the court noted that the WCA had always 
been interpreted to bar employees' claims for uninsured 
motorist benefits only from employers who were self- 
insured. Id. at 182. Employees' claims on uninsured 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 6. As noted, Ducjai involved the issue of whether one employee is 
immune from a common-law suit for damages brought by another 
employee injured in the course of employment. Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 102- 
03. Therefore, the Court's discussion of uninsured motorist coverage was 
not necessary for its decision. The Superior Court soon noted that this 
language from the Supreme Court's opinion was dictum. Palmosina v. 
Laidlaw Transit Co., 664 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
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motorist policies purchased by the employer had not been 
barred by the WCA. Id. 
 
Secondly, the court rejected the suggestion that the 
legislature's repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737 indicated an 
intent to bar recovery of both workers' compensation and 
uninsured motorist benefits. Id. at 182-83. Instead, the 
Superior Court observed that the repeal of Sections 1735 
and 1737 had taken place alongside the legislature's repeal 
of the portion of Section 1720 that had previously 
prevented subrogation against a claimant's tort recovery by 
a workers' compensation insurance carrier. Id. at 183. 
According to the court, these repeals should be understood 
as part of a single plan: 
 
       Thus, before the amendment, a claimant could not 
       recover amounts paid or payable under workers' 
       compensation and, balanced against that provision, a 
       workers' compensation carrier had no right of 
       subrogation for workers' compensation benefits. By 
       contrast, after the 1993 amendments, a plaintiff 's 
       recovery is not reduced by the amount of workers' 
       compensation benefits, and the workers' compensation 
       carrier has the right of subrogation for any benefits 
       paid in connection with the action. 
 
Id. (quoting Schroeder v. Schrader, 682 A.2d 1305 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1996)). This, of course, is a much different 
understanding of the legislature's intent than that 
expressed in Ducjai. 
 
Finally, the Warner court noted that legislative intent 
must be especially clear for it to conclude the legislature 
had intended to forbid employers from buying optional 
uninsured/underinsured motorist policies for the benefit of 
employees. Warner, 688 A.2d at 183. The court noted that 
the Supreme Court has held that such fringe benefits are 
"voluntarily bargained for and have an independent 
contractual vitality." Id. at 184 (quoting Wagner v. National 
Indem. Co., 422 A.2d 1061, 1067 (Pa. 1980). See also 
Panichelli v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group, 669 A.2d 930, 932-33 
(Pa. 1996) (holding that an injured employee's recovery of 
workers' compensation as well as sick pay and social 
security benefits was not unlawful "double dipping"). 
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Moreover, according to the Superior Court, a claim on a 
policy purchased by the employer is not a claim against the 
employer; therefore, the uninsured motorist carrier cannot 
"borrow" the employer's immunity from suit. Warner, 688 
A.2d at 184 (quoting Boris v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 
21, 24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)). 
 
The Superior Court did not discuss in Warner its prior 
Ducjai holding or the Supreme Court's affirmance, which 
contained the strong, pertinent dicta about uninsured 
motorist benefits. In a post-Warner case, however, the 
Superior Court narrowly read Ducjai as precluding only an 
employee's negligence action against a co-employee. 
Gardner v. Erie Ins. Co., 691 A.2d 459, 463-64 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997). An action against the co-employee's uninsured 
motorist carrier, said the court, was not subject to the 
WCA's exclusivity provisions and was not precluded. Id. at 
464. That was so because the injured employee's suit was 
not against the employer or any source attributable to the 
employer; instead, the suit was analogized to one against "a 
third-party tortfeasor's liability insurance." Id. See also id. 
at 464-65 (noting that a suit against even the employer's 
uninsured motorist carrier is not, under Warner, a suit 
against the employer). Under the Superior Court's analysis, 
as enunciated in Warner and Gardner,7 there is no legal 
barrier to DiBartolo's receipt of both workers' compensation 
and uninsured motorist benefits. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
As a federal court sitting in diversity, we must apply the 
substantive law as decided by the state's highest court.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The dissent repeatedly suggests that Warner is the only Superior 
Court case that is at odds with the dicta from Ducjai. It is clear from 
Gardner, however, that the Superior Court recognized its disagreement 
with the Supreme Court's dicta but concluded that its reasoning, first 
enunciated in Warner, was more sound. 
 
8. The district court's interpretation of state law is subject to plenary 
review. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239 (1991). 
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Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 & 
n.15 (3d Cir. 1996). Because the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed the issue before us now, 
we must forecast how the Supreme Court would resolve the 
issue. Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 
1993). Applicable decisions of the Superior Court must be 
accorded significant weight. Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 
F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1991). The "carefully considered 
statement[s]" of the Supreme Court in dicta in Ducjai also 
inform our prediction. McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 
F.2d 657, 662 n.21 (3d Cir. 1980). Although it is a close 
case, we are ultimately persuaded by the Superior Court's 
compelling reasoning in Warner.9  
 
B. 
 
First, we note with approval that the Warner court 
considered the larger context surrounding the repeal of 
Sections 1735 and 1737. In particular, the Superior Court 
saw the repeal of Section 1735 as directly related to the 
contemporaneous repeal of Section 1720. Warner, 688 A.2d 
at 183. Thus, the Superior Court understood the legislature 
to have been exchanging one comprehensive system for 
another. In the previous arrangement, a workers' 
compensation carrier had no right to subrogate against an 
employee's claim and the employee could not recover 
from the uninsured motorist carrier any amounts payable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Citing McKenna, the dissent states that in making our prediction of 
state law we must examine "in order of priority: the decisional law of the 
highest state court in analogous cases; the dicta of that court; and to a 
lesser degree, the decisional law of lower state courts." The dissent, 
however, overstates its argument. McKenna does not hold that the dicta 
of a state's highest court must necessarily trump the better-reasoned 
decisions of the state's intermediate courts. Indeed, we note that 
McKenna explicitly warned that "a federal court should be circumspect 
in surrendering its own judgment concerning what the state law is on 
account of dicta." 622 F.2d at 662. The rule of McKenna is that we "must 
consider relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered 
dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data.. . ." Id. at 663. 
McKenna provided no rigid hierarchy that requires us to enforce the 
Supreme Court's dicta in the face of a better-reasoned, subsequent 
decision of the Superior Court. 
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under workers' compensation. Id. In the new arrangement, 
the employee's recovery from the uninsured motorist carrier 
is not to be reduced by the amount of any workers' 
compensation benefits payable, but the workers' 
compensation carrier is given the right of subrogation for 
any benefits paid to the employee under workers' 
compensation. Id. 
 
According to the Warner court, the repeal of Sections 
1735 and 1720 effected a single plan. Under the post-repeal 
law, the injured employee is permitted to recover both 
workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits, 
including a possible recovery from each of these two 
sources for the same injury. The collection by the employee 
of the uninsured motorist benefits, however, merely creates 
a fund against which the workers' compensation carrier can 
exert a subrogation lien for amounts it paid the employee 
for the already-recompensed injury. Id.; Gardner, 691 A.2d 
at 465. Understood in this broader context, the repeal of 
Section 1735--like the repeal of Section 1737--did not 
affect the ability of employees to recover both workers' 
compensation and uninsured motorist benefits. 10 Indeed, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Travelers contends the Warner court misunderstood the significance 
of the legislature's decision to allow workers' compensation carriers the 
right of subrogation against a claimant's tort recovery. It suggests that 
permitting the workers' compensation carrier to subrogate against the 
motor vehicle insurer is irrational. Travelers would limit the workers' 
compensation carrier's ability to subrogate to situations where a third- 
party tortfeasor has injured the employee. 
 
We do not see a difference between subrogating against a tortfeasor 
and a motor vehicle insurer. See Gardner, 691 A.2d at 463-64. In both 
instances, the workers' compensation carrier is trying to recover what it 
already paid out as a result of harm to an employee caused by some 
third party. There is no legal significance to whether that third party 
was 
an uninsured motorist or some other malefactor. If there is such 
significance, Travelers has not pointed it out. 
 
Here Travelers serves as both the workers' compensation carrier and 
the motor vehicle insurer for DiBartolo's employer. In many 
circumstances, however, one insurance company will not perform both 
roles. We agree with DiBartolo that it is only Travelers' dual role that 
makes it appear that DiBartolo wants to "rob Peter to pay Paul." In any 
event, if Travelers finds the current arrangement economically inefficient 
or unduly complicated, its remedy lies with the legislature. 
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the repeal of Section 1735 permitted the injured employee 
to recover more from these sources, although the workers' 
compensation carrier may ultimately be the beneficiary--by 
the use of its subrogation lien--of any double recovery. See 
Gardner, 691 A.2d at 466 (Hudock, J., concurring). 
 
We note that the Superior Court's interpretation of 
Section 1735 in Warner is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's statement in Hackenberg that 1735 was only a 
limitation on what kinds of policies uninsured motorist 
carriers could write. Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 883. 
Travelers argues that Section 1735 actually authorized the 
employee's recovery of both workers' compensation and 
uninsured motorist benefits. This is not an outrageous 
claim, given the Supreme Court's dicta in Ducjai that the 
repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737 ended the recovery of 
both types of benefits. Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 106. This 
interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the Court's 
prior treatment of Section 1735 in Hackenberg. Given this 
unexplained inconsistency and the fact that the Supreme 
Court did not have the issue directly before it in Ducjai (as 
did the Supreme Court in Hackenberg and the Superior 
Court in Warner), we are persuaded by the Superior Court's 
analysis of the repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737. 
 
Thus, we conclude that neither Section 1735 nor Section 
1737 was the source of the ability of employees to collect 
both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist 
benefits. Although it is not clear when employees began to 
be able to collect both types of benefits, it is clear that the 
ability to collect both types was judicially recognized and 
was independent of Sections 1735 and 1737. See, e.g., 
Chatham, 570 A.2d at 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 605 
A.2d 329 (Pa. 1992) (noting that an employee could 
apparently have collected both types of benefits even in the 
absence of Section 1735). See also State Farm Ins. Cos. v. 
Ridenour, 646 A.2d 1188, 1190-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) 
(collecting cases). Given this case law11  and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Travelers argues that the law prior to the legislature's enactment of 
Sections 1735 and 1737 did not permit an employee's recovery of both 
workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits. 
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inapplicability of Sections 1735 and 1737, we view the 
repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737 as irrelevant to the issue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Travelers interprets Hackenberg as holding that no employee can 
collect both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits. As 
we have noted, the Superior Court held in Hackenberg that only self- 
insured employers are immune from providing uninsured motorist 
benefits. See, e.g., Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 885 (holding is limited to 
"self-insured" employers); Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 885-86 (Cappy, J., 
concurring and dissenting on the ground that the court's distinction 
between self-insured and other employers was irrational). Indeed, 
Hackenberg makes clear that neither Section 1735 nor Section 1737 can 
be fairly understood as the source of an employee's ability to recover 
both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits. Id. at 883 
& n.9. 
 
In addition, Travelers argues that the appellate cases that have allowed 
an employee to recover both types of benefits have misinterpreted the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 552 
A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1989). See also Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 106 (questioning the 
use of Selected Risks by the Superior Court). As Travelers correctly 
points out, Selected Risks involved an unusual fact pattern, where the 
disputed uninsured motorist plan could not fairly be said to be the 
employer's. Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 882-83 n.8. To the extent the 
Superior Court has relied on Selected Risks, however, it has not strongly 
relied on a misapprehension that the disputed policy in Selected Risks 
was an employer's. In Chatham, 570 A.2d at 512, for instance, the 
Superior Court relied instead on the logic of Selected Risks (that 
workers' 
compensation and uninsured motorist benefits do not provide for the 
same types of damages and that there is no public policy against 
employers acquiring policies that more fully cover employees)--not on a 
belief that Selected Risks was controlling. See also id. (noting that 
Selected Risks spoke to its issue only "in glancing terms"). The cases 
that 
followed Chatham relied on it, not directly on Selected Risks. See, e.g., 
Ferry, 573 A.2d at 611. 
 
In the end, Travelers' quibbles are not with the Superior Court's 
Warner decision but, instead, with the Supreme Court's own decision in 
Hackenberg, where it sanctioned a distinction between self-insured 
employers and employers who purchase uninsured motorist plans. 586 
A.2d at 881 & n.4, 884-85. See also id., 586 A.2d at 885-86 (Cappy, J., 
concurring and dissenting). Although the Supreme Court seemed in 
Ducjai to have qualms about the Superior Court's reliance on Selected 
Risks, the Court did not repudiate its previous decision in Hackenberg. 
As Hackenberg and Warner more squarely presented the issue now 
before us, those holdings are more persuasive than the Ducjai dicta. 
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we must decide. See Warner, 688 A.2d at 183 (noting that 
"[i]n light of the prior case law which the legislature was 
well aware of when it enacted [the repeals], we are unable 
to conclude that the legislature intended that the 
[exclusivity] provisions of the WCA would preclude 
recovery"). To end the recovery of both types of benefits, the 
legislature would have to take clearer action than the silent 
repeal of inapplicable sections. 
 
C. 
 
We also find convincing the Superior Court's emphasis in 
Warner on the fact that uninsured motorist coverage is now 
optional, and we predict the Supreme Court would adopt 
the Superior Court's analysis. Because uninsured motorist 
coverage is no longer mandated by the state, the Warner 
court viewed an employer's voluntary purchase of such 
coverage as a decision to provide employees with a fringe 
benefit. Id. at 184. We agree. When viewed as a fringe 
benefit that employers provide their employees (or that 
employees demand as a condition of employment), 
uninsured motorist coverage cannot be subject to the 
exclusivity provisions of the WCA. Wagner, 422 A.2d at 
1067 (the Supreme Court noting that an employer or 
insurance carrier is "precluded from asserting" immunity 
for fringe benefits because of their "independent contractual 
vitality").12 Since the coverage is purchased for the 
employee's benefit and not to protect the employer from any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Travelers argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Wagner 
supports its contention that the law never permitted recovery of both 
workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits. That opinion, 
however, interpreted the state's No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 
which preceded the MVFRL. Wagner did hold that employees could not 
receive both types of benefits, but that holding was premised on the fact 
that the No-Fault Act mandated both no-fault and workers' 
compensation coverage. Wagner, 422 A.2d at 1067. As uninsured 
motorist coverage became optional as the result of legislative actions 
including the repeal of Section 1735, Wagner may counsel that 
uninsured motorist coverage is now a fringe benefit that can benefit 
employees because of its "independent contractual vitality." Id. In any 
event, case law interpreting the No-Fault Act is no longer controlling. 
Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 884. 
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of its own wrongdoing, there is no immunity for the 
workers' compensation carrier to borrow from the employer. 
Warner, 688 A.2d at 184. Moreover, as the Supreme Court 
recently noted, an employee's collection of a fringe benefit 
does not "result in double dipping," the harm the 
exclusivity provision of the WCA is designed to prevent. 
Panichelli, 669 A.2d at 932.13 
 
Travelers suggests that employers likely purchase 
uninsured motorist plans only to protect (i) their clients 
and customers who ride in company vehicles and (ii) their 
employees when they drive company vehicles outside the 
course and scope of their employment. While it is obvious 
that employers might well purchase uninsured motorist 
plans for the reasons Travelers lists, there is no reason why 
employers might not also purchase plans to benefit their 
on-the-job employees. Indeed, employers may do so 
because workers' compensation covers only a small portion 
of the types of damages an injured worker might suffer. 
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 552 A.2d 1382, 1388 
(Pa. 1989); Chatham, 570 A.2d at 512. Uninsured motorist 
plans can cover pain and suffering, wage loss, and 
consequential damages that are unavailable under workers' 
compensation. Selected Risks, 552 A.2d at 1388. Travelers 
does not offer any explanation why Pennsylvania would 
wish to bar employers from attempting to shield their 
employees from all of the types of on-the-job injuries the 
employees might suffer. Since DiBartolo's employer 
voluntarily purchased uninsured motorist coverage, we are 
satisfied that this fact would cause the Supreme Court to 
view the insurance policy as a fringe benefit. As a fringe 
benefit, the policy has "independent contractual vitality," 
and DiBartolo's recovery under the policy is not barred by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Indeed, in this regard, DiBartolo notes that he is not seeking 
benefits 
for the injuries covered by workers' compensation; instead, he is seeking 
coverage for the additional injuries he suffered, injuries that are 
covered 
only by the uninsured motorist plan. 
 
Even if DiBartolo received a "double recovery," the repeal of Section 
1720 of the MVFRL mandates that the workers' compensation carrier 
would have a subrogation lien on any amounts paid the employee for 
any already-recompensed injury. Warner, 688 A.2d at 183. 
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the exclusivity provisions of the WCA. Wagner, 422 A.2d at 
1067. 
 
IV. 
 
In this appeal, we are faced with a difficult choice. On 
one hand, there is the clear, recent dicta in Ducjai, 
suggesting the Supreme Court would view the repeal of 
Sections 1735 and 1737 as dispositive. On the other hand, 
there is the even more recent Superior Court opinion, 
Warner, that places the legislative repeal in a larger and 
much different context. We are persuaded by the Superior 
Court's opinion, both because of the depth of its analysis 
and because Warner is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
own discussion of the repealed sections in Hackenberg. We 
find particularly persuasive the Warner court's reasoning 
that uninsured motorist coverage is best viewed as a fringe 
benefit now that uninsured motorist plans are optional. 
 
Because we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would hold that Pennsylvania law does not preclude an 
employee's recovery under both worker's compensation and 
an employer's voluntarily-purchased uninsured motorist 
plan, we will reverse and remand this matter to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue 
before us in well-reasoned dicta: "the repeal of Sections 
1735 and 1737 of the MVFRL in 1993 has assured that the 
double recovery . . . is no longer permitted." Ducjai v. 
Dennis, 656 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1995). The district court cited 
Ducjai in its order. I see no reason why this is not a 
conclusive statement of Pennsylvania law. Indeed, I suggest 
that to do otherwise does violence to a consensus reached 
by a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
DiBartolo argues that a single Pennsylvania Superior 
Court case is compelling, and should be the basis of our 
construction of state law despite the clear statement of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ducjai. This conclusion is 
not supported by case law that dictates our obligations 
when reviewing a diversity case. 
 
As a federal court sitting in diversity, we are bound to 
either follow the pronouncement of the state's highest 
court, or forecast its position if no holding directly 
addresses the issue before us. City of Philadelphia v. Lead 
Industries Assn. Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Carefully considered, relevant statements by a state 
supreme court, even if technically dicta, provide a federal 
court with reliable indicia of how the state tribunal would 
rule on a particular question. Nolan v. Transocean Air 
Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 296, 81 S.Ct. 555, 557 (1961); 
McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 
(3d Cir. 1980). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
discussed the precise issue before us, so we need not 
speculate or forecast how it would hold on this issue. 
 
The court in Ducjai discussed whether an employee can 
collect benefits under workers' compensation and 
uninsured motorist insurance in strongly-worded dicta that 
should be controlling. Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 106. Ducjai 
prohibited double recovery in the exact fact pattern 
presented here. 
 
DiBartolo relies upon Warner v. Continental/CNA 
Insurance Co., 688 A.2d 177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), to argue 
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that he can obtain benefits under workers' compensation 
and uninsured driver benefits. Warner analyzes the same 
fact pattern presented here. Warner's conclusion regarding 
double recovery is at odds with the dicta in Ducjai; yet it 
does not discuss Ducjai. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court opted not to review 
Warner. Our task remains to predict whether, in light of 
Ducjai, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would approve of 
Warner's rationale. I think it would not. 
 
DiBartolo contends that we should use Warner to 
construe Pennsylvania law because it is a more persuasive 
consideration of the effect of the repealed statutes. I 
disagree, not for the substance of his argument, but 
because our standard of review limits our interpretation of 
Pennsylvania law. We cannot simply ignore the state 
supreme court and cite one intermediate appellate court 
case to the contrary. 
 
The central conflict between Ducjai and Warner concerns 
the effect of the legislature's repeal of two provisions of the 
motor vehicle financial responsibility law. These two 
provisions supported case law allowing an individual to 
obtain worker's compensation and uninsured motorist 
benefits for an on-the-job accident. See Chatham v. Aetna 
Life & Cas. Co. 570 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)(declined 
to follow by Ducjai); Ferry v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 
610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)(same). 
 
In Ducjai, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded 
that by repealing Sections 1735 and 1737, the 
Pennsylvania legislature intended to preclude double 
coverage and instead treat work-related car accidents like 
all other employment-related accidents: compensable under 
workers' compensation only. Ducjai, 656 A.2d at 106. 
However, Warner held that exclusivity provisions of the 
Worker's Compensation Act do not prevent a claimant from 
recovering uninsured motorist benefits, despite the repeal 
of the statutory provisions that would support this 
argument. 688 A.2d at 183. 
 
As a federal court sitting in diversity we predict the state 
supreme court's position on an issue by examining, in 
order of priority: the decisional law of the highest state 
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court in analogous cases; the dicta of that court; and to a 
lesser degree, the decisional law of lower state courts. 
McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 
(3d Cir. 1980). Decisions of lower state courts should be 
accorded proper regard, but not conclusive effect in 
interpreting state law, especially when the highest court 
has already addressed the issue in dicta. Id. 
 
In this case, the dicta in Ducjai should carry great 
weight. Ducjai is a recent case; there has been no 
subsequent change in the statute; and there are no 
indications that the court is about to abandon this view. 
See Cowgill v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 780 F.2d 324, 331 
(3d Cir. 1985). We should only diverge from precedent with 
caution, and then only when we are given convincing 
evidence of a doctrinal trend that the highest state court is 
substantially certain to follow. W.A. Wright, Inc. v. KDI 
Sylvan Pools, Inc., 746 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). I 
suggest that one lower state court case, even if it is well 
reasoned, does not constitute a trend. See Scotts African 
Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African 
Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 
78, 92 (3d Cir. 1996) (five cases from lower appellate courts 
are sufficient to show the doctrinal trend required by 
McKenna). 
 
In sum, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the 
effect of the repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737 on double 
recovery in Ducjai. Even though it discussed the issue in 
dicta, it is a clear manifestation of the sentiments of the 
court regarding the issue in this case: the repeal of Sections 
1735 and 1737 prevents an employee from recovering 
benefits from workers' compensation and an uninsured 
motorist policy. That is the precise issue in before us; 
therefore I would affirm. 
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